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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of market definition in antitrust law is to identify a grouping of
sales such that a single firm who controlled them could maintain prices for a
significant time at above the competitive level. The goal is not to delineate
market boundaries for their own sake, but rather to identify situations in which
* Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa. © 2012, Herbert Hovenkamp.
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firms can profitably maintain prices that are significantly above costs. The
ability to do this is called market “power.” Thus, we sometimes say that a
market is the grouping of sales controlled by a hypothetical monopolist or
collusive group.1 Further, a relevant antitrust market consists of firms that are
not merely rivals, but also that are sufficiently close rivals that the competition
of the others is able to hold each firm’s prices relatively close to its costs. That
is to say, mere substitution is not sufficient; it must be substitution at a price
close to cost. Having delineated a relevant market, antitrust decision makers
next examine single-firm market share data or information about the number
and size-distribution of firms in order to assess how a particular action might
harm competition. Alternatively, sometimes we assess market power by observ-
ing price–costs relationships and consumer behavior directly, without engaging
in market definition.2 In many cases, however, antitrust case law requiring a
showing of market power also requires a market definition, even if technical
economic methodologies do not.
As Lemley and McKenna suggest in their article on market definition, the set
of conceptions and procedures that go into “market definition” in antitrust can
be quite different from those that go into market definition in IP law.3 When the
issue of market definition appears in IP cases, it is mainly as a query about the
range over which rivalry occurs. This rivalry may or may not have much to do
with a firm’s ability to charge a high price. For example, a trademark infringer
may steal sales from the senior mark’s owner even though the two firms are
operating in a competitive market and neither could ever expect to charge much
more than the competitive price. Even in patent law, firms who own patents on
their products or processes may bring infringement suits against rivals, even
though both parties compete with dozens of other firms. To borrow an illustra-
tion from the authors’ title, if Coke should accuse Pepsi of stealing its trade
secrets or copyrighted promotional material, it really would not matter if Coke
and Pepsi were in competition with other soft drink brands that were sufficient
to hold Coke and Pepsi’s prices to cost—although that fact might be necessary
to the computation of damages. In sum, although the scope of the market is
often relevant in IP infringement or remedies cases, antitrust’s requirement of
market power is not.
Lemley and McKenna suggest that one problem with antitrust market defini-
tion is that it has become too “ossified” to the extent it relies on static
1. For a good recent example of the approach, see United States v. H & R Block, Inc., No.
11–00948, 2011 WL 5438955, at *8 (D.D.C. Nov. 10, 2011) (relevant market consists of computer tax
programs and not all commercial methods of tax preparation).
2. See 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & JOHN L. SOLOW, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 515, 521c
(3d ed. 2007); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Markets in Merger Analysis, 57 ANTITRUST BULL.
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 13 (citation omitted)), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id1945964.
3. Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? Market Definition in
Antitrust and IP, 100 GEO. L.J. 2055, 2056–59 (2012).
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assumptions about changes in price and output but ignores or downplays the
role of innovation.4 Historically, that criticism is well-taken. Antitrust policy
makers have been aware of this problem for years, however, and have re-
sponded with tools that require looking not merely at the current market, but
also at movements that might affect the exercise of market power in the future. I
disagree, however, with their conclusion that “direct” measures, which attempt
to assess power without the need for market definition, are necessarily superior
in this regard.5 These alternative empirical methodologies, which economists
have developed over the last two decades, try to assess power by measuring
customer responses directly—asking, for example, how many sales or how
much revenue would be lost if a firm increases its prices by a given amount.
These methodologies make it possible to assess an individual firm’s power over
price, or the effects of a merger, without defining a relevant market.6 Direct
estimate methodologies, however, are pure “snapshots” of customer responses
to price changes, taking no account of the ability of other firms to make their
own products more attractive.7 That is, they are, if anything, even more
indifferent to innovation than the classical market definition methodologies that
we use today.
The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines have addressed this problem by
considering the ability of other firms to innovate and thus alter consumer
choices from the current measure,8 but the very generality of the query indicates
its limitations. With or without market definition, market power assessment will
probably never do a good job of taking innovation into account because
innovation is so badly behaved, often producing completely unanticipated
results. This constraint applies to both traditional and nontraditional forms of
market power analysis. As a result, a fact-finding such as the one in Microsoft
that a relevant market exists for “Intel-compatible” computer operating sys-
tems9 is extremely vulnerable to technological change, but a conclusion about
power that examined purchasing shifts in response to direct price changes
would have been equally vulnerable. Technological change is exogenous to both
approaches. Neither considers a variety of factors, such as the possibility that
Apple might switch to an Intel-based system, which occurred less than a decade
4. Id. at 2058.
5. See id. at 2101–16.
6. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437, 479 n.80 (2010).
For a summary of the methodologies, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §§ 12.3–12.5 (4th ed. 2011).
7. See Dennis W. Carlton, Revising the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON.
619, 638–39 (2010); Herbert Hovenkamp, Harm to Competition Under the 2010 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, 39 REV. INDUS. ORG. 3, 11–12 (2011).
8. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 6.4 & ex. 19
(2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html. On the use of nonmar-
ket share-based estimates of power in innovation-intensive markets, see Hovenkamp, supra note 2.
9. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 50, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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later,10 or that rivals might develop both Intel-based and non-Intel-based sys-
tems that would compete effectively with Windows. Making these predictions
requires a crystal ball that neither traditional relevant market criteria nor direct
measurement can provide.
Antitrust is more sensitive to market structure than any discipline, despite
that the relevant statutes say little about structure.11 It has either developed or
borrowed technical conceptions of market concentration, market power, market
share, entry barriers, and economies of scale and scope, all of which can go into
an antitrust assessment of competitive effects.12 By contrast, the IP laws say
almost nothing about structure and largely proceed without these inquiries.
Intellectual property law could have gone down a different route. In the last half
century in particular, we have learned much about the relationship between
market structure and innovation—about the types of industries in which patents
work better and are more valuable, those in which trade secrets are preferred, or
where first-mover advantages alone provide sufficient incentives. We know a
great deal about where copying is easiest, thus justifying strong protection, and
where it is much more difficult. Knowing all of this, IP law might have
developed much more “market specific” rules than it has, and if those rules had
been properly formulated and applied, we would be in a better place than we are
today.13 This might have happened in one of two ways: first, the specifications
could have been spelled out in a much lengthier statute that related various
elements of market structure to different specifications of IP duration or scope.
Second, as in antitrust, Congress might have passed a statute that simply
authorized courts to take structural issues into account when they assessed the
scope of IP rights and infringement.
What we have, however, are IP laws that proceed as if market structure does
not matter. To be sure, there is less consensus and poorer quality information
about the relationship between market structure and innovation than about the
relationship between market structure and traditional power over price under
constant technology. But that hardly justifies a set of protections that are
invariant to market structure in those areas where it counts most. In the
Supreme Court’s Prometheus decision, briefly discussed below, Justice Breyer’s
10. See Press Release, Apple Inc., Apple to Use Intel Microprocessors Beginning in 2006 (June 6,
2005), http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2005/06/06Apple-to-Use-Intel-Microprocessors-Beginning-in-
2006.html (announcing plans to transition to Intel microprocessors in all of its Macs by the end of
2007).
11. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006), says nothing whatsoever about market
structure. Section 2, id. § 2, makes it unlawful to “monopolize” but does not define that term. Various
Clayton Act provisions make it unlawful to engage in specific practices whose effect may be to
“substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly,” without relating those terms to
structure. See, e.g., id. § 14 (tying and exclusive dealing); id. § 18 (mergers).
12. See 2B AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 2, at chs. 5 & 6.
13. One exception is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat.
2860 (1998), which protects digital works and thus includes “market specific” rules. See also Plant
Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2006) (applying IP-like protections for plants); Plant Variety Protection
Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2582 (2006 & Supp. 2009) (same).
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opinion for a unanimous Court may have opened a narrow window for differen-
tiating the application of patent law with the market in question.14
In any event, as Lemley and McKenna point out, IP law sometimes employs
concepts of market definition, although these are mainly in the areas where it
does not count most.15 This Response argues that the conception of “market
definition” in IP has two meanings that apply in different circumstances. First,
when we are speaking strictly about the scope of IP rights and remedies for
infringement, the relevant concept of “market definition” really refers to the
range of interfirm rivalry. The question in these cases concerns mainly the
identification of an IP holder’s rivals and the degree of substitution between
them, but it is not generally concerned with market power. Further, often the
rivals who are considered are the rights holder and the infringer but not other
firms in the market. Second, when we consider a variety of postissuance
practices, antitrust’s more technical understanding of market power becomes
relevant. However, these latter situations are more typically addressed under
antitrust or misuse principles.
I. HOW MARKETS ARE RELEVANT
A. MARKETS VS. BRANDS
Lemley and McKenna suggest that the antitrust methodology for assessing
markets tends to produce small markets, often limited to a single brand.16 For
example, Coke and Pepsi may be in different markets.17 Historically, however,
this has not been the case.18 Indeed, antitrust law has found that a single firm’s
brand constitutes a relevant market in only a few situations,19 such as when the
purchaser of a specialized piece of durable equipment is locked in by this
purchase and must buy that firm’s aftermarket supplies or services as well.20 As
a result, practices such as exclusive dealing in markets for branded products are
never antitrust violations unless the branded seller independently has market
power based on shares of a more general product market.21
14. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012); see also
infra note 82 and accompanying text.
15. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 3, at 2059–60.
16. See id. at 2080–91.
17. See id.
18. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 114 F. Supp. 2d 243, 255–56 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (single market for
all soft cola drinks distributed by fountain); see also PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 101, 108
(2d Cir. 2002) (Coke lacked market power sufficient to support a monopolization claim).
19. See 2B AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 2, at ¶ 563d.
20. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481–82 (1992); 2B
AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 2, at ¶ 564b.
21. E.g., Sheridan v. Marathon Petrol. Co., 530 F.3d 590, 595 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that market
power could not be inferred from Marathon’s trademark and brand); Rick-Mik Enters. v. Equilon
Enters., 532 F.3d 963, 973 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that, even when operating as a joint venture, the
Shell and Texaco brands did not confer enough market power to warrant a conclusion of market power).
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For some period of time, antitrust policy did tend to define markets in terms
of a single seller’s products when they were covered by intellectual property
rights. In its Illinois Tool Works decision in 2006, however, the Supreme Court
overturned a long-standing presumption that holding a patent created market
power for antitrust purposes.22 That decision expressly overruled the Loew’s
decision, which had concluded that market power could be inferred from the
copyright on a movie.23 It also implicitly overruled decisions such as Chicken
Delight, which had held that market power could be inferred from a trade-
mark,24 as recognized by lower courts.25
Lemley and McKenna cite evidence that many customers are willing to pay a
premium for their first choice brand over their second choice.26 But that
observation tells us little about market definition unless we know the answers to
some important additional questions. The first is premium over what: cost or the
current price? Further, are the studies about paper towels or automobiles? As
they observe, the data are not specific about the product. The data they cite
suggest that 50% of customers would pay a 25% premium over their second
choice.27 Does this mean that, if Toyota raised the price of a Highlander from
$30,000 to $40,000, 50% of customers would continue to buy the Highlander
rather than pay $30,000 for its closest rival, the Honda Pilot? Finally, the
information is useless if the “premium” price reflects quality differences that
show up in cost. For example, branded paper towels may cost 25% more
because they have absorption or durability qualities that consumers desire, but
they also cost 25% more to make. Or a Volvo may cost more than a Ford of
similar size and performance because the Volvo employs more costly safety
devices.
Occasionally antitrust cases find single-brand markets,28 but today this is
almost always because there is market dominance in an underlying product. For
example, Microsoft Windows was found to have substantial market power, but
neither the company name “Microsoft” nor the product name “Windows” was
relevant to that decision.29 Indeed, the same court refused to find that Mi-
crosoft’s branded internet browser, Internet Explorer, dominated a relevant
market.30 Rather, what mattered was that the court found a relevant market for a
22. See Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006).
23. See United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45–46 (1962), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works, 547
U.S. at 28.
24. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 50 (9th Cir. 1971), abrogated as recognized by
Rick-Mik, 532 F.3d. at 963.
25. See, e.g., Rick-Mik, 532 F.3d at 974 n.3 (recognizing decisions like Illinois Works have abrogated
Chicken Delight); Sheridan, 530 F.3d at 593–94 (same).
26. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 3, at 2086.
27. See id.
28. See, e.g., Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1203–04 (9th Cir.
1997) (Kodak branded parts and service), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1094 (1998); see also 2B AREEDA,
HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 2, at ¶ 563d (discussing other cases).
29. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 54–56 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
30. Id. at 82–84.
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particular type of computer operating system not readily interchangeable with
others and that Windows occupied some 95% of that market; by contrast, the
market for internet browsers was not well-defined.31
B. PRODUCT BOUNDARIES VS. MARKET BOUNDARIES
Most IP rights are too narrow to confer much in the way of market power.
This generally applies to patents and even more forcefully to copyrights and
trademarks. The power of IP rights is “boundary exclusion” but only rarely
“market exclusion.”32 For example, a farmer has the boundary exclusion power
to exclude trespassers from her corn patch, but that power rarely confers any
power over the price of corn or even farmland.
A few pioneer patents do confer significant market power, particularly if they
are broadly interpreted. For example, the Wright Brothers’ patent was able to
shut out alternative aircraft in the United States for some time thanks to a broad
interpretation under the doctrine of equivalents.33 Most patents do nothing of
the kind, which is not to say that patents are irrelevant to determinations of
market power. Historically, patent portfolios have been one of many factors that
courts have considered in determining the scope of a firm’s market power.
Copyrights confer significant power rarely and trademarks more rarely still.
What IP rights do grant is an asset that may be impossible for others to
duplicate. This power to exclude has value, depending on both its legal strength
and its market strength. Before such an asset leads to power, however, it must
produce an advantage in either cost or attraction to consumers. A patent may be
strong legally but still not offer much exclusionary power if nobody wants what
it has to offer. Copyrights are only as valuable as the works to which they are
attached, and these often become economically worthless long before the
copyright expires.
So it is almost never correct to say that an IP right confers market power. A
better way to state the issue is that an IP right may grant freedom from
duplication and thus permit appropriation of whatever value an underlying asset
already has. But if it is attached to something of no value, then the IP right will
not confer any value. This is true of boundary exclusion generally. The right to
keep people out of my bean patch gives me the right to appropriate whatever
productive value the patch has. If the patch is rocky, without water, and
worthless to begin with, however, the fence and no trespassing signs will not
add any value to it. My title could be rock solid but my property is still
worthless.
31. Compare id. at 54–56, with id. at 82–84.
32. See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING
LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION ch. 4 (2012).
33. See Wright Co. v. Herring-Curtiss Co., 204 F. 597, 614 (W.D.N.Y. 1913); see also Robert P.
Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839,
890–91 (1990).
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C. MEASURING POWER WITHOUT MARKET DEFINITION: FIXED COSTS
One place where IP rights create an image of market power can often be an
illusion, created by some of the nonmarket-share measurement tools that we use
for assessing power, such as cost–price margins. For example, the Lerner Index
assesses market power by looking at the relationship between price and mar-
ginal cost. The index, which is (P  MC)/P, reads in a range from zero in a
perfectly competitive market, where price equals marginal cost, to one in a
market in which the ratio of price to marginal cost is infinitely high.34 Formally,
it can measure the market power of a single firm without requiring a market
definition.
The Lerner Index can create an illusion of market power because, in many
IP-rich markets, the ratio of fixed to variable costs is extremely high, and
marginal cost measures only variable cost. A good example is digital media. It
costs millions of dollars to develop a program such as Microsoft Office, but
once developed, the program can be burned to a DVD for a few cents or
perhaps downloaded for virtually nothing. If the sale price is in fact $250, this
gives a Lerner Index reading that is off the charts and suggests enormous
market power. In such cases, we can assess power only by looking at a
product’s full lifecycle and determining whether total revenues were sufficient
to cover investment costs. For example, if developing Windows costs
$100,000,000 and Microsoft sells 1,000,000 copies over the product’s lifecycle,
then $100 per copy would be required to cover the fixed costs alone. If one
looks at short run production costs alone, most books cost no more than $8 or
$10 to make, but they typically sell for prices ranging from $25 to $100 or even
more. This suggests a great deal of monopoly power, but the fact is that most of
these “monopolies” end up in the remainder bin six months after they are
printed.
Lemley and McKenna suggest that, conceding the presence of high fixed
costs in IP-intensive markets, marginal cost might be the better measure of
market power in any event because “allocating fixed costs to IP-protected
products seems to confuse market definition and market power analysis with the
policy desirability of allowing companies to recoup these costs.”35 But this
assumes that antitrust currently defines markets strictly by looking at marginal
cost when, in fact, it does not. In the short run, firms increase output when the
price exceeds marginal cost. But longer run supply responses require the
construction of fixed cost assets, and antitrust policy routinely considers these
as well. For example, measuring entry barriers into a market requires asking
whether a firm can reasonably anticipate that it will recover its fixed cost
34. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, at § 3.1a; see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 939–40 & fig.1 (1981); A. P. Lerner, The
Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly Power, 1 REV. ECON. STUD. 157, 169 (1934).
35. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 3, at 2096.
2140 [Vol. 100:2133THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
investment in the new enterprise.36 Indeed, one of the difficulties of the “direct”
measurement methodologies of market power that do not depend on market
definition is that they do not employ a useful concept of resource redeployment.
To the extent that they ignore the ability of rivals to redeploy resources into new
products or new configurations, they tend to exaggerate power. The 2010
Horizontal Merger Guidelines have attempted an as yet untried corrective for
this.37 In this sense, traditional market definition measures are probably superior
to direct measures because they take new investment into account. For example,
the relevant market query in mergers and some other antitrust analysis does not
consider who is in the market right now at current prices but rather who would
be in the market if a small but significant and nontransitory price increase
should occur.38
II. QUESTIONS OF IP SCOPE AND REMEDIES: MARKET DELINEATION
BUT RARELY MARKET POWER
A. IP AND ANTITRUST INQUIRIES: IMPORTANT SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES
As Lemley and McKenna illustrate, IP law engages in a form of “market
definition” in a wide variety of contexts. Specifically, IP law often uses substitu-
tion or market criteria in order to make decisions about the scope of IP rights or
the remedies they confer. For example, in IP law the measurement of damages
often poses a problem of demand substitution—indeed, the lack of provable
substitution suggests why both patent and copyright law offer deviations from
common law damages methods (that is, lost sales), adopting instead formula-
tions such as lost licensing fees or, in the case of copyright, profits earned by the
infringer.39
At the simplest level, the damages problem is one of market substitution,
which requires an idea about who and what are in the market. For example, in
an extreme case, a patentee might have a product monopoly and a single
infringer makes a precise copy of the patented product. The inference is strong
that each sale by the infringer steals a sale from the patentee in a one-to-one
ratio. Things begin to break down, however, when (1) the market contains more
than these two firms or (2) the patentee’s product and the infringer’s product are
differentiated from one another. They are complicated even further when the
patentee and the infringer have different costs, perhaps because the infringer is a
copyist who did not bear innovation expenses but has only production costs. For
36. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, at §§ 1.6, 3.5c.
37. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
38. HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, at § 3.2.
39. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) (2006) (noting that copyright damages can equal “actual damages and
any additional profits of the infringer” or statutory damages); 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006), amended by
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 20(j), 125 Stat. 284, 335 (2012) (noting that
patent damages are “adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable
royalty”); see also BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at chs. 3 & 6.
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example, the pirate selling hacked copies of Microsoft Office could probably
charge $3 per copy. In this case, the hacker not only steals sales but also brings
into the market many people who were unwilling to pay Microsoft’s $250 price.
Significantly, these complicating factors are the rule, not the exception. If the
patentee is not a product monopolist but rather one of several firms, then sales
by the infringer do not measure lost sales to the patentee because at least some
of the infringer’s sales will be taken from other manufacturers in the market.40
If the primary and infringing products are differentiated, customer substitution
will also be complicated, and the complications only increase as the patented
technology is a smaller portion of the entire product.
Lemley and McKenna suggest that these problems involve “the classic
hallmarks of antitrust market definition and power analysis.”41 This is true in at
least a crude sense. Measuring the diverted sales from patent infringement could
involve methodologies for estimating “diversion ratios” of products from one
firm to another, methodologies such as those used in antitrust analysis of
mergers. Depending on the availability of data, one might estimate the demand
for the patentee’s product in situations where the infringer’s product is and is
not present. This method could provide information both about how many sales
the patentee lost to the infringer and also about whether the patentee had to cut
its product price in order to compete with the infringer.42
But these methodologies are used as an alternative to market definition—
indeed, that explains why they are so controversial in antitrust cases—because
the Supreme Court appears to insist on a market definition even though the
latest economic methodologies do not.43 In sum, such methodologies are really
not approaches to market definition at all but rather statistical estimates of
diverted sales based on demand and pricing relationships.
Various “alternative” measures of damages authorized under the Patent and
Copyright Acts—namely lost licensing fees, infringer’s profits, or statutory
damages—are all designed to enable patent and copyright law to get away from
market definition issues altogether. Licenses are seller–buyer relationships that
are fundamentally vertical or complementary rather than horizontal, although,
of course, the licensor and licensee may also happen to be competitors. In order
40. Justice Holmes encountered this problem already in a common law tort case of palming off. See
Mosler Safe Co. v. Ely-Norris Safe Co., 273 U.S. 132, 134 (1927) (holding that, where plaintiff had
numerous competitors making similar safes, plaintiff could not show that defendant’s sales were taken
exclusively from plaintiff).
41. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 3, at 2070.
42. On the use of diversion ratios to assess competitive harm in merger cases, see Joseph Farrell &
Carl Shapiro, Recapture, Pass-Through, and Market Definition, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 585 (2010) and
Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to
Market Definition, 10 B.E. J. OF THEORETICAL ECON., no. 1, 2010, at Article 9, available at http://www.
bepress.com/bejte/vol10/iss1/art9. For a good history of the use of such methodologies in merger
analysis since the late 1990s, see David Scheffman, Malcolm Coate & Louis Silvia, Twenty Years of
Merger Guidelines Enforcement at the FTC: An Economic Perspective, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 277 (2003).
43. See Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 5–8.
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to estimate lost licensing revenue we do not need to know who the IP owner’s
competitors are; we may need to know, however, who the other licensees are
(but only for purposes of comparison) and they are likely not to be competitors.
By the same token, infringer’s profits under the Copyright Act are not
intended to be a mere surrogate for market substitution damages that cannot be
assessed, as would be true in a case involving competitors in the same market.
Lost profit damages are typically assessed when the copyright holder owns a
song or work of art or fiction and the infringer incorporates part of it into a
noncompeting work, such as a promotional campaign, television commercial, or
musical.44 Once again, the relationship between the rights holder and the
infringer is best characterized as vertical, or perhaps complementary, but not
competitive.
Another important difference between antitrust and IP has to do with the
relationship between the legal violation and market output. Antitrust condemns
practices that tend to increase prices by reducing market output, often making it
essential to define the market. Indeed, one of the reasons that antitrust policy
has been restrictive about competitor lawsuits is that so many of them fail to
identify any kind of relationship between the challenged violation and reduced
market output.45 For example, the rival in the tied market challenging the
dominant firm’s tying arrangement might readily be able to show that it lost
sales because of the tie. But a condition for illegality is that the tie be
anticompetitive, which requires a showing that either the actual or natural
tendency of the tie is to reduce output in the tied product market, producing
higher prices.46 This assessment classically requires a market definition.
By contrast, IP infringement almost always increases output. That is to say,
the IP holder’s output losses from substitution are virtually never as large as the
infringer’s gains. In many cases, the IP holder does not suffer any actual losses
at all, such as when the infringing good is a complement rather than a substitute.
In other cases, the infringer’s product steals sales from multiple rivals, some of
whose products did not infringe. Output increases are ceteris paribus a good
thing and they benefit consumers so IP infringements also benefit consumers in
the short run. Indeed, they are socially harmful only on the premise that they
reduce the incentive to innovate in future situations, thus leading to less creative
production. This makes “substitution harm” unsuitable for most IP cases; the
problem is not simply one of proof but of fundamental conception.
44. E.g., Andreas v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 336 F.3d 789, 791–92 (8th Cir. 2003) (addressing
defendant’s use of copyright holder’s slogan on a drawing in its automobile commercial); Bouchat v.
Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 516–17 (4th Cir. 2003) (football team incorporated
plaintiff’s drawing); Mackie v. Rieser, 296 F.3d 909, 911–14 (9th Cir. 2002) (infringer Seattle
Symphony engaged in promotional campaign that incorporated plaintiff’s art work).
45. See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at ch. 3.
46. E.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 24–25 (1984), abrogated on other
grounds by Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (noting that the lack of market
power precluded independent anesthesiologist’s claim that defendant hospital tied its own anesthesiologi-
cal services).
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B. MARKET DELINEATION IN CASES INVOLVING DESIGN, EXPRESSION, AND FUNCTION
As Lemley and McKenna point out, the relationship between “design” and
market definition shows up in a number of ways but most particularly when
elements of design or expression spill over into functionality.47 A “design” that
commandeers the entire set of reasonable alternatives can end up dominating a
market. For example, if one could patent a wheel’s roundness as a “design,” she
could effectively hijack the entire market for wheels and tires; square wheels do
not roll nearly as well.
IP law uses several devices in order to prevent design boundaries from
overreaching. For example, the doctrine of functionality in trademark law,
particularly the law of trade dress, limits the use of marks so as to protect design
but not function.48 Obtaining a trademark—and thus, the power to exclude—for
something that is functional is somewhat akin to obtaining a patent of indefinite
length without meeting patent law’s much stricter requirements for protection.49
As Lemley and McKenna point out, assessing the relationship between trade-
mark law and functionality often entails identifying the relevant range of
competitive alternatives—that is, a form of market delineation.50 They show
that similar concerns are relevant to trademarks that are determined to have
become generic—essentially meaning that the name has migrated from manufac-
turer or brand identity to market identity. In order to make this determination,
however, one must identify the range of rivalry.51 Significantly, these cases are
not concerned with market power at all and certainly not in the sense that
market power is a prerequisite to a finding of overreaching. Indeed, the cases
often involve disputes between two firms, neither of which is dominant in its
market.52
Copyright law poses similar problems when copyrighted “expression” spills
over into function.53 The problem frequently arises in cases that involve soft-
ware when a particular expression exhausts the available alternatives for carry-
ing out a particular function. For example, there are only so many ways to say
“print” or “delete file” in a computer program and only so many ways of
organizing pull-down menus or other operator readable instructions.54 In these
cases, the copyright holder may be using a protection of its “expression” as a
47. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 3, at 2060.
48. See, e.g., Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001) (“[T]rade dress
protection may not be claimed for product features that are functional.”).
49. See id.; see also Lemley & McKenna, supra note 3, at 2060.
50. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 3, at 2060.
51. Id. at 2066.
52. See, e.g., Stormy Clime, Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 972–73 (2d Cir. 1987) (consider-
ing whether trademarked design features were, in fact, functional; plaintiff’s product sales in market for
rain apparel were approximately $2.1 million annually).
53. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 3, at 2073 (discussing particularly Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t,
Inc., 616 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2010)).
54. E.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815–17 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding
plaintiff’s menu command is an uncopyrightable method of operation).
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device for limiting the availability of competitive alternatives. Once again, the
impact can be assessed only by examining the range of alternatives that the
market offers. But this is certainly not market definition in the antitrust sense. In
this case, the query does not necessarily consider the identity or number of firms
in the market at all but rather the alternative ways of expressing a command that
performs a specific function. Overly broad assertions may constitute “misuse,”
but in that case we have moved from IP to essentially antitrust criteria for
assessing competitive effects.55
A related area that Lemley and McKenna did not mention is design patents,
which raise competition issues when a design serves to limit interoperability
with the products of competitors. For example, by obtaining a design patent on
an aftermarket automobile part such as a bumper, an automobile manufacturer
might try to prevent downstream rivals from building aftermarket bumpers for
its cars. The manufacturer would do so not because of any technological feature
in the bumper, but merely because the only way to make a bumper that will
“interconnect” with a Chrysler is to infringe the design patent.56 The issue has
come up in a number of other contexts, including the relationship between
printers and ink cartridges57 as well as between locks and key blanks.58 Signifi-
cantly, Chrysler is not a monopolist and its aftermarket bumper “tie” would
probably be lawful under the antitrust laws. But the interconnection issue
forecloses application of a design patent with no query at all into market
structure.
C. IP RIGHTS AND PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION
Product differentiation and IP rights often go hand in hand. Product differen-
tiation is generally profitable to producers, and profits are larger because a firm
can increase the “distance” in product space between itself and its rivals. Harold
Hotelling famously modeled product differentiation in a story about hot dog
vendors arrayed on a beach: the farther apart they are, the higher they can price
their product without losing sales to rivals.59 Commodities are least likely to
exhibit meaningful product differentiation. To be sure, coal or potatoes may
55. See infra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.
56. Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Auto Body Panels of Ohio, Inc., 908 F.2d 951, 952–54 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(denying preliminary injunction to truck manufacturer seeking to enforce design patents in such a way
as to prevent rivals in the aftermarket from making their bumpers compatible with design patentee’s
trucks; affirming district court’s conclusion that bumper design was more functional than ornamental).
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 45–47 (2010),
available at http://www.uiowa.edu/ibl/InnovationCompetitionPolicyCasebook.shtml.
57. Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 830, 838–42 (E.D. Ky.
2007) (stating that a printer maker could not use a design patent on a microprocessor chip in order to
make the printer inoperable with rivals’ print cartridges).
58. Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that the key
blade blank for making door keys had shape and configuration dictated by functional concerns and
could not be protected by design patent whose effect was to prevent rivals’ keys from fitting into the
patentee’s lock).
59. Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41, 45–48 (1929).
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exhibit quality differences, may have company or product names (trademarks),
and, in some cases, manufacturers may even process patents for their produc-
tion. For the most part, however, IP does not play a significant role in the
analysis of market power for commodities. IP has a strong role to play in
markets for distinctive manufactured goods, which are precisely those markets
where market definition is least useful because it invariably either exaggerates
or understates power. In antitrust, many of the most vexing issues of product
market definition have arisen in markets in which IP rights were a significant
factor.60
Product differentiation serves to make the traditional process of market
delineation less useful in antitrust analysis. The market definition process is
inherently binary in the sense that a product is either inside or outside of the
market. But in a product differentiated market, both conclusions are commonly
“wrong.” For example, if the inquiry concerns the market power of a maker of
oil-based paint, excluding latex paint tends to exaggerate the market power of
the oil paint manufacturer. It ignores competition that latex in fact provides. On
the other hand, including latex paint tends to understate the market power of oil
paint because it yields the conclusion that the two are perfect competitors when,
in fact, there are some uses for which oil paint is preferable. This explains why
the government’s merger enforcement agencies have spent the last two decades
trying to develop econometric alternatives to traditional market definition.61
Lemley and McKenna argue that, to the extent antitrust market definition is
based on an assumption of undifferentiated products, antitrust market definition
tends to define markets too broadly.62 They argue that product differentiation
may call for radically narrower market definitions than antitrust currently
employs and perhaps even the conclusion that single brands in product differen-
tiated markets constitute “monopolies.”63 As an empirical matter, they are
probably right. In many cases, courts have defined differentiated markets too
broadly, ignoring the fact that many of the goods that were included were not
capable of holding the defendant’s prices to cost.64 But there are other cases in
which differentiated markets were defined too narrowly. A good, recent example
is the Lundbeck decision, in which the Eighth Circuit held that the only two
60. E.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 380–81 (1956) (discussing
cross-elasticity of demand of technologically diverse products; “cellophane fallacy”). On the “cello-
phane fallacy,” see Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serv., 504 U.S. 451 (1992), involving
aftermarkets and lock-in, FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., 650 F.3d 1236, 1240–42 (8th Cir. 2011), involving
substitution rates between pioneer and generic drug in presence of third party decision making, and
United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2004), involving unilateral effects
in product differentiated market. See also 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
¶ 539 (3d ed. 2008).
61. See supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text.
62. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 3, at 2077.
63. Id.
64. E.g., E.I. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 394–99 (placing highly distinctive cellophane, glassine, aluminum
foil, and brown wrapping paper in the same market).
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drugs that treated a particular condition, but which were not bioequivalents,
were in different markets.65 As a result, the merger that united them under a
single firm was lawful.66
The relationship between product differentiation and unwarranted exercises
of market power is in fact quite complex. The impact of product differentiation
depends in significant part on whether we are concerned about unilateral or
collusive exercises of market power. On the one hand, product differentiation
serves to make firms less-than-perfect competitors; that is, individually they
have downward sloping demand curves. On the other hand, product differentia-
tion also makes collusion much more difficult and cartels less stable.67
One thing that product differentiation does not do, however, is lead to
monopoly prices, at least not without some additional assumptions. This ex-
plains antitrust policy’s quite appropriate reluctance to infer single-brand or
narrow markets from the simple fact of differentiation. One characteristic of
innovation-intensive markets is relatively high fixed costs. Under perfect compe-
tition, prices will be driven to short-run marginal cost, making it difficult for
firms to obtain returns on significant fixed cost investments. The result can be
that innovation will dry up. Incorporating product differentiation into our
analysis changes that outcome by giving firms enough competitive distance
from one another to allow them to recover a fixed cost component. As long as
resources are mobile, however, returns will be above marginal cost but not
significantly above average total cost.68 That is to say, within innovation-
intensive markets, “perfect competition” is a holy grail that is not worth
pursuing. Not only would a world in which product differentiated firms were
considered monopolists lead to extraordinarily high antitrust enforcement costs,
but a goal of driving firms to perfect competition would be a significant
deterrent to innovation. This conclusion is supported by substantial literature
that indicates that the innovation-versus-market-structure relationship is ex-
pressed by an “inverted U” shape, suggesting that neither monopolists nor
perfect competitors innovate much. Most innovation goes on in moderately
concentrated product-differentiated markets.69
65. Lundbeck, 650 F.3d at 1240–41.
66. Id. at 1240–41; see generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Mergers, Market Dominance and the
Lundbeck Case, 12 CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE, Dec. 2011, at 1, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
1968151.
67. See Herbert Hovenkamp & Christopher R. Leslie, The Firm as Cartel Manager, 64 VAND. L.
REV. 813, 826 (2011).
68. The classic text on this topic is EDWARD H. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLIST COMPETITION
(1933). See also RAM KRISHNA MANDAL, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 251–53 (2007); JEFFREY M. PERLOFF,
MICROECONOMICS: THEORY & APPLICATIONS WITH CALCULUS 485 (2008); THE MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
REVOLUTION IN RETROSPECT (Steven Brakman & Ben J. Heijdra eds., 2004); JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 274–95 (1988). For a simple graphical analysis, see Cost and Revenue for
Monopoly and Monopolistic Competition, WOLFRAM DEMONSTRATIONS PROJECT, http://demonstrations.
wolfram.com/CostAndRevenueForMonopolyAndMonopolisticCompetition/ (last visited July 2, 2012).
69. See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 9–10.
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Direct measurement methodologies in these situations may find significantly
narrower markets than does traditional market share analysis. For example, if
one asked whether a price increase to 5% or 10% above marginal cost would
induce so many customers to switch from Dell Computers to other brands that
the price increase would be unprofitable, the answer might be no. This would
suggest that “Dell Computers” is a relevant market. But we get that answer
precisely because the “snapshot” inquiry involved in such direct measurements
completely ignores the ability of Dell’s rivals to innovate in response, making
its product a closer or more effective substitute. Or, to state this differently, a
problem with traditional market definition approaches to power is that they tend
to lump Dell and other computers into the same market, ignoring the differences
between them. By contrast, a problem with direct measurements based on
observed customer behavior is that, although they account more fully for
current product differences, they do not take innovation mobility into account.
The key assumption here is mobility. The majority of IP rights do not limit
resource mobility in any important sense. In these cases, it is important not to be
deceived into thinking that monopoly is present where prices are higher than
short-run marginal cost. Books, software, and insulated coffee mugs with patent
numbers printed on their bottoms are presumably sold at prices higher than
short-run marginal cost. Unless these IP rights impose significant limitations on
the ability of rivals to reconfigure their own products, the amount of profit
created will not be greater than what is needed to maintain diversity in that
industry. The problem arises when resources are not mobile—that is, when the
occasional market shifting patent or copyrighted computer program is such a
significant innovation that inventing around it is impossible.
As a policy matter, we protect most IP not because we expect that it will
create monopoly, but rather because it will create sufficient product differentia-
tion to justify short-run returns above marginal cost that are sufficient to
incentivize the significant fixed cost investment that innovation requires. The
inducement for creating it is the prospect of these returns. Brand names,
novelists, song writers, and most patentees and holders of trade secrets do not
constitute monopolies. However, they sometimes do create products that are
sufficiently distinguishable in the eyes of consumers that they are worth the
costs of acquiring or maintaining the IP right. The value added comes from
most consumers’ preference for diversity in product offerings. We do not want
to read the same novel, listen to the same song, or eat the same prepared food
over and over again, even though these products might be cheaper if there were
only one version that could be produced in enormous quantities and sold under
perfect competition.
D. COMPETITION POLICY, MARKET DELINEATION, AND IP SCOPE
Some problems of IP scope do present market definition issues that come a
little closer to the concerns of antitrust policy, which is to limit practices that
reduce market-wide output or restrain innovation. In most cases, however, IP
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policy does not require definition of a market so much as an understanding of
the relationship between the IP holder and the accused infringer or, in some
cases, the IP holder and subsequent innovators in the same field. For example,
in interpreting the scope of fair use in copyright, we really do not need to define
a market, although we may have to examine the relationship between the
copyright owner’s product and the product of the defendant who claims fair use.
At the same time, however, questions about market impact may be relevant.
For example, the fair use requirement of harm to the market for the copyrighted
work may require a court to identify what that market is.70 Once again,
however, the issue is not power but rather the impact of the infringer’s sales on
the rights holder. Further, what courts actually do in measuring harm to the
market in a copyright case bears little resemblance to what an antitrust court
does in order to measure market harm. In antitrust, market harm consists of
reduced market output, higher prices, or, in some cases, market exclusion that
creates an inference of one of these things. In fair use cases, on the other hand,
one can find a few examples of such harm. For example, in Harper & Row,
Time magazine cancelled its purchase agreement after infringer The Nation
published some excerpts from former President Gerald Ford’s memoirs.71 The
loss of a large sale could certainly constitute market harm, but the Supreme
Court did not even think about what the “market” was. Apparently, it assumed
that the market was “President Ford’s Memoirs” and never examined the impact
of The Nation’s theft on memoirs generally, books generally, or any other
product category. So “harm to the market” really meant “harm to the plain-
tiff”—a proposition that antitrust policy categorically rejects.72 Other fair use
“harm to the market” cases do not do this much and often find harm to the
market without any evidence of reduced output, higher prices, or even economic
harm to the plaintiff.73
In any event, I agree with nearly all of Lemley and McKenna’s recommenda-
tions about scope, whether evaluating scope requires a process akin to antitrust
market definition. First, copyright protection must cut a narrower path through
the range of derivative works.74 This is only rarely a market definition problem,
however, because derivative works are often not competing goods at all but
rather complements or unrelated goods.75 Primary products typically do not
compete with parodies; Beanie Babies, for instance, do not compete with books
about Beanie Babies. The “market definition” question, insofar as competition
70. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 3, at 2074.
71. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 541–42 (1985).
72. See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 47–56.
73. E.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1396 (6th Cir. 1996);
see id. at 1396 (Merritt, J., dissenting) (“[P]laintiffs here have failed to demonstrate that the photocopy-
ing done by defendant has caused even marginal economic harm to their publishing business.”); see
also BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 141–42.
74. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 3, at 2104–07.
75. See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 151–52.
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is concerned, arises only when the accused derivative work is a substitute for
the primary work and has at least enough proximity to take some of its sales.
For most derivative works, the real injury to the copyright holder, if any, comes
from lost licensing fees rather than from market substitution.
The issue is a little clearer in trademark law because so many instances of
substantial similarity also involve competing products. One problem here oc-
curs when trademark law is used to suppress competition by limiting compara-
tive advertising or the number of avenues along which consumers can compare
products. That is why it is so critical that an accused trademark infringer use the
mark “as a mark” and not simply as a device for getting its own clearly
distinguishable products before consumers in a comparative environment.76
“Trademark use” is thus one area in which trademark policy can usefully
incorporate concerns about competition policy.
The most troublesome area concerning IP scope is patent rights, because it is
here that the strongest relationships exist between market structure and innova-
tion. The problems are manifold and the literature is vast, reaching such issues
as the proper breadth of the doctrine of equivalents, continuations and after-
arising technologies, or the level of abstraction that the patent system should
tolerate.77 These issues often arise when patent claims are not associated closely
enough with specific technology or sometimes where the patent does not claim
any technology whatsoever, but only a method of marketing or selling some-
thing using technologies that have been developed by others.78
The way in which market delineation should factor into this analysis is a
complex question. The problems are often related to competition and even to
market structure. For example, an overly broad doctrine of equivalents can
serve to stifle competing inventions, thus protecting or enlarging any monopoly
that a patentee may have. By contrast, an overly narrow doctrine may stifle
innovation by permitting later actors to invent around primary inventions,
thereby depriving them of market value. By and large, however, the courts
address these issues by looking at the relationship between the patentee’s
technology and that of the alleged infringer, not at the general market structure.
One notable exception is Judge Newman’s dissent from the Federal Circuit’s
decision in Festo, which the Supreme Court ultimately reversed, although not
on the grounds that Judge Newman urged. In arguing for a broad patent doctrine
of equivalents, Judge Newman referenced the famous Schumpeter–Arrow “de-
bate” over the relationship between market structure and innovation and sided
with Schumpeter.79 She argued for broad patent protection that would grant
76. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 3, at 2111; see, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc.,
414 F.3d 400, 402–03 (2d Cir. 2005).
77. For a summary and analysis, see BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at chs. 1, 4 & 5.
78. Id. at ch. 5.
79. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 640 (Fed. Cir. 2000),
rev’d, 535 U.S. 722 (2002). The word “debate” is placed in quotation marks because not only did
Arrow write twenty years after Schumpeter, but Schumpeter (1883–1950) had already been dead for ten
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sufficiently broad scope to the inventor who opens a new field, to provide
adequate economic incentives while avoiding duplication of effort and discour-
aging recourse to secrecy. . . . [L]ong-term economic growth requires a policy
framework that encourages the creation and commercialization of new tech-
nologies, as contrasted with a policy that facilitates appropriation of the
creative product, lest the creative product dry up in the face of too-easy
appropriation.80
The fact is that most of the voluminous scholarship on the relationship
between market structure and the rate of innovation has been largely ignored in
the patent case law.81 This is in sharp contrast to the antitrust case law, which
has been heavily preoccupied with the relationship between market structure
and the likelihood of anticompetitive acts. However, Justice Breyer may have
suggested a new course for patent law in the Supreme Court’s recent Pro-
metheus decision. He observed that “patent law’s general rules must govern
inventive activity in many different fields of human endeavor, with the result
that the practical effects of rules that reflect a general effort to balance these
considerations may differ from one field to another.”82 If that is the case, it
could signal an important and welcome development based largely on judge-
made, or “common law,” considerations of market diversity, just as these
judgments are made in antitrust law.
I am more enthusiastic than Lemley and McKenna are about the proposition
that we should require copying as a prerequisite to patent infringement.83
Congress is unlikely ever to legislate such a reform, so the issue is only of
academic importance. The problem of innocent infringers results from several
factors. One is a system that permits ambiguous and broadly drafted claims that
serve to obfuscate what the patentee actually had in his or her possession—a
problem that is particularly acute in information technologies.84 Another is the
state of the law of anticipation and nonobviousness, which, notwithstanding the
years. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1950); Kenneth J.
Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF
INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609–26 (1962).
80. Festo, 234 F.3d at 639–40 (citing, inter alia, SCHUMPETER, supra note 79, Arrow, supra note 79,
and Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977)); see
also Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1529–36 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(Newman, J., concurring) (expressing similar views about the doctrine of equivalents), rev’d, 520 U.S.
15 (1997).
81. One pair of authors assert that more has been written on the relationship between market
structure and innovation than any other area in the field of industrial organization. See Wesley M.
Cohen & Richard C. Levin, Empirical Studies of Innovation and Market Structure, in 2 HANDBOOK
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1059, 1060 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds.,
1989).
82. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012) (citing
BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 98–100).
83. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 3, at 2069–72.
84. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND
LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 46–72 (2008).
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Supreme Court’s efforts to tighten it up in KSR,85 continues to permit too many
obvious patents. When something is obvious a great many other people will
discover it on their own and patenting such inventions serves to restrain rather
than promote innovation. A third problem is late-claiming, or continuations,
which permit patentees to write subsequent claims on previously filed applica-
tions.86
One coherent way to address all of these problems is to make knowledge of
another’s relevant patent a prerequisite for infringement, and measure knowl-
edge by an objective test that considers the availability of reasonable and timely
notice. A reasonable and prudent person in this context is one who should have
known about another’s patent(s) and that the accused technology was covered
by their patent claims. Late claims would be enforceable only from the date that
they were made of record and publicized. Such a change would radically alter
the incentives of patentees. They would have every incentive to provide prompt
notice rather than disguise their rights. We would likely see the emergence of
private “Orange Books” for patents in a variety of technologies.87 In all events,
we can assume that patent markets would adjust themselves to the new environ-
ment.
The real property system has developed its highly successful notice system
based on two simple propositions: first, providing notice is much cheaper than
searching. Second, the less clear property interests are visible from an inspec-
tion of the property itself, the stronger the obligation to provide notice through
the recording system. The result is to reverse completely the psychology of
notice in real property. For example, we do not have “real property trolls”
surreptitiously placing nondevelopment covenants on land awaiting some unsus-
pecting developer. The penalty for not providing adequate notice that a reason-
able person would discover, and in the correct chain of title, is that the covenant
becomes unenforceable.88
III. POST-ACQUISITION IP PRACTICES THREATENING COMPETITION OR INNOVATION
Many postissuance practices involving IP rights do require an assessment of
market power and not merely the identification of rivals. Most of these practices
are best addressed under the antitrust laws or, in some cases, misuse doctrine.
85. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415–28 (2007).
86. See Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L.
REV. 63, 71–83 (2004) (highlighting the problems of continuations).
87. See, e.g., Merck & Co., Inc. v. Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co., 482 F.3d 1317, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(discussing the “Orange Book,” a publication by the FDA that “provides notice of patents covering
name brand drugs”).
88. See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 393–94. For additional thoughtful discussion of
the issue, noting the definitional problems in identifying truly independent discoveries, see John M.
Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 586–90 (2010).
2152 [Vol. 100:2133THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
A. POWER AND CONDUCT
In antitrust law the assessment of power is frequently related to a specific
type of conduct, and some types require more power than others. Further,
sometimes the requisite power can be inferred from the conduct itself.89 For
example, Lemley and McKenna fret about the extent of competition between
pioneer and generic drugs and observe several situations in which consumer
preferences for brands are significantly stronger than preferences for generics.90
Does this mean that the two are in separate markets? The answer is that it really
does not matter if we are facing a situation in which a pioneer firm has paid a
great deal of money to keep the generic out of its market.91 Firms do not make
such payments in order to keep out complementary or unrelated products that
have no impact on the demand for the product. For example, if Chrysler does
not make washing machines itself and has no plans to do so, it would not be
willing to pay much to GM in order to keep GM out of the washing machine
market. The large payment from the pioneer to the generic is all the “market”
evidence we need that the two products compete,92 although there may still be
questions about patent validity and the scope of patent grants. In short, the high
payment itself provides us with what we need to know about the “power” aspect
of this question.
B. PRICE DISCRIMINATION
Price discrimination, which Lemley and McKenna discuss as presenting
problems in market definition,93 is strictly a postissuance practice that almost
always involves licensing restrictions or the computation of royalty rates.
Technically, price discrimination occurs when a seller obtains different rates of
return from two or more sales. As this definition indicates, price discrimination
is not simply the charging of two different prices, and it often occurs when
nominal prices are the same. The most commonly cited example in IP law is the
variable-proportion tying arrangement in which the seller cuts the price of a
tying product and increases the price of tied products. As a result the seller earns
a higher rate of return from high-intensity users.94
89. See 2B AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 2, at ¶ 520a (observing that some conduct is
irrational except on the premise that the actor(s) has significant market power).
90. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 3, at 2098–2100.
91. See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and
Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (2009); Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark
Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV.
1719 (2003).
92. This assumes that the large payment is not for some other purpose, such as avoiding litigation
costs. In that case, the payment might be rational no matter the market relationship between the parties’
products.
93. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 3, at 2090.
94. See Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Harm, 52 ARIZ.
L. REV. 925, 944 (2010).
2012] 2153MARKETS IN IP AND ANTITRUST
Intellectual property rights can facilitate both second- and third-degree price
discrimination. In second-degree price discrimination, the seller offers a price
schedule and buyers select how much they pay in the process of selecting how
much to buy. Quantity discounts are one example; variable proportion tying
arrangements are another. In third-degree price discrimination, a seller distin-
guishes two or more groups of customers in advance and charges them different
prices. IP often facilitates such discrimination because licensing restrictions
serve to restrict “arbitrage,” which occurs when one set of customers can resell
to another set. Well-known examples are the Supreme Court’s General Talking
Pictures patent decision95 and the ProCD copyright decision in the Seventh
Circuit.96 Both involved and approved licensing restrictions that charged differ-
ent prices to commercial and noncommercial users.
Today most price discrimination is not an antitrust problem. It generally
produces positive, or at least ambiguous, welfare results and typically does not
exclude anyone. Further, it does not generally reduce incentives to innovate but
rather increases them. As a result, price discrimination typically should not be
an IP problem either. Indeed, second-degree price discrimination is inherent in
most IP licensing arrangements, which measure royalties by the number of
times an IP-protected good or process is used or the number of units that are
created. All of these cases involve returns to the patentee that vary with the
licensee’s use but not with the licensor’s costs. In all events, however, price
discrimination creates no inferences whatsoever of competitive harm in the
absence of a finding of market power in the antitrust sense, which requires a
showing that the defendant could profitably raise price by reducing market-wide
output.
C. POSTSALE RESTRAINTS AND EXHAUSTION
Restraints covered by the first sale (“exhaustion”) rule are postissuance
practices that may sometimes harm competition or restrain innovation. Other-
wise they are probably competitively harmless. The current “per se” rule,
applied under the rubric of patent exhaustion in the Supreme Court’s Quanta
decision, makes market delineation or inquiries into market power irrelevant.97
Once a patented article has been sold, further restraints on that article are
unenforceable without query into power or anticompetitive effects.98 Of course,
one can avoid the doctrine altogether by using a license agreement rather than a
sale, but enforcement of licensing agreements is limited by requirements of
95. Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938) (manufacturing licenses
subject to field-of-use restrictions and segregating products intended for commercial theater use from
those intended for home use).
96. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (software differentially priced to
commercial and noncommercial users); see also BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 22–23
(discussing examples of third-degree price discrimination).
97. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008).
98. Id. at 625–27.
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privity of contract and must be enforced under breach of contract rather than IP
rules.99 Significantly, antitrust law and misuse doctrine apply to all of these
restraints without regard to whether the underlying transaction was a sale or a
license agreement.100 Further, antitrust and misuse doctrine can examine the
substance of the restrictions themselves to see if any useful social purpose is
served by refusing to enforce them—something that the first sale doctrine’s
categorical approach precludes.101 In determining whether a particular postsale
restraint is competitively harmful, market delineation or some alternative mea-
sure of market power is necessary.
Thus, I am less excited than Lemley and McKenna about the perpetuation of
the first-sale doctrine.102 In its current form, the doctrine is far too draconian—a
ham-handed attempt to provide IP-law constraints that would be much better
evaluated under the law of antitrust or misuse. Historically, the majority of first-
sale cases involved practices that were also addressed under antitrust or misuse
law. Indeed, vertical territorial restraints were addressed under the first-sale
doctrine even before the antitrust laws were passed,103 and the Supreme Court
created its harsh rule against resale price maintenance in a first-sale case three
years before it applied the same rule in an antitrust case.104 The same thing
applies to tying arrangements, which migrated from first-sale law to misuse and
later to antitrust law.105 Throughout the twentieth century, first-sale cases in the
Supreme Court tracked a regime of hostility against resale price maintenance
and territorial restraints that the Supreme Court was also expressing under
antitrust laws. In that sense Quanta seems quaint and out of step, restating a per
se rule even though the antitrust rules governing similar conduct have been
abandoned.
99. E.g., Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908) (copyright first-sale doctrine); see
also Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First Sale Doctrine in
Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 487, 519–20 (2011).
100. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2006) (applying tying and exclusive dealing prohibitions to all
contractual conditions and to goods “whether patented or unpatented”).
101. See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 373.
102. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 3.
103. E.g., Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 456–57 (1873) (using first-sale doctrine to refuse
to enforce vertical territorial restraint on resale of patented coffin lid).
104. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 384–85 (1911) (subjecting
resale price maintenance to per se illegality under Sherman Act), overruled by Leegin Creative Leather
Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907 (2007) (placing resale price maintenance under rule of
reason); see also Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 350–51 (applying copyright first-sale doctrine and refusing
to enforce resale price maintenance clause).
105. See in chronological order: Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77
F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896) (variable proportion tie; first-sale doctrine); Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1
(1912) (variable proportion tie; first-sale doctrine); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg.
Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917) (same; first-sale doctrine and misuse); Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents
Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931) (same; misuse); and Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947)
(same; antitrust), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42–43 (2006); see
also BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at chs. 2, 10 & 11.
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The position that Lemley and McKenna urge is the same as that taken by the
United States government. In cases one year apart, the Solicitor General urged
the Supreme Court to abandon the antitrust per se rule against resale price
maintenance but also to reject Federal Circuit precedent and adhere to a per se
rule against postsale patent restraints.106
The real difference between postsale restraints and contractual licensing
restrictions is that the latter require privity of contract. A privity requirement
certainly limits a form of “power” in the sense that the rights cannot be enforced
against successors and assigns who have not dealt directly with the rights
holder. But real problems arise only in extreme cases, and then misuse or anti-
trust policy can help out. Historically, every restriction imposed as a postsale
condition on a patented or copyrighted product could have been evaluated under
either antitrust or misuse doctrine.
Once again, the law of real property recognizes covenants that “run with the
land,” which means that they do not have to be contracted and recontracted
every time that land is transferred. The result has undoubtedly been to stabilize
land markets such as residential subdivisions but hardly to create monopoly.
Once a covenant is found to “run with the land,” it can be enforced against
subsequent and even remote purchasers without regard to privity of contract
between the plaintiff and the defendant.107
D. POOLS, STANDARD SETTING, AND OTHER COLLABORATIVE LICENSING
Lemley and McKenna do not discuss the role of market definition in IP cases
involving pooling, standard setting, cross licensing, or other forms of IP distribu-
tion that involves collaboration among rivals. This is one area where market
analysis can be extremely useful—at least as useful as it is in cases involving
tying or postsale restraints. Most of the litigated cases involving pooling or
other forms of collaborative licensing are concerned with the threat of collu-
sion.108 Most of the literature defending pooling relates to transaction cost
savings, product complementarities, or the need for interconnection or compat-
ibility across a single technology sold by multiple sellers.109 With Christina
106. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Quanta Computer, Inc.
v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2007) (No. 06–937), 2007 WL 3353102, at *18–26 (advocating harsh
per se rule against postsale restraints under patent exhaustion rule); Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Leegin, 551 U.S. 877 (No. 06–480), 2007 WL 173650, at *6–29
(advocating lifting of per se rule against resale price maintenance).
107. See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 893–95 (2008);
Hovenkamp, supra note 99, at 518–19.
108. See 12 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 2041–46 (3d ed. 2012) (forthcoming) (on file
with the author).
109. E.g., Richard J. Gilbert, Antitrust for Patent Pools: A Century of Policy Evolution, 2004 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 3; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Competition for Innovation, COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 17), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id2008953 (noting significance of query whether patents in pool function as complements or
substitutes).
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Bohannan, I have argued that an important motivation for collaborative licens-
ing in many situations, particularly in information technologies, is boundary
ambiguity.110 This is a fairly straightforward problem of commons management.
When the cost of defending individual boundaries rises higher than the costs of
commons management, producers prefer commons organization.111 The prob-
lem of boundary ambiguity in patent law is pervasive; if patent boundaries were
clearer and more reasonably communicated to others, there would be far less
need for massive licensing and cross-licensing that often involves thousands of
patents. Given the situation that we have, however, this is a problem of
determining when antitrust or perhaps misuse law should intervene. Given the
many justifications for collaboration coupled with the threat of collusion or
innovation restraint, this is prime territory for rule of reason analysis, which, in
turn, requires market definition.
CONCLUSION
Market structure and power are most likely to be relevant to IP when a
lawsuit is analyzed under the antitrust laws rather than IP law. For example,
antitrust’s Walker Process doctrine refuses to condemn fraudulent patent infringe-
ment suits unless the structural preconditions for monopoly have been met,
which include a dominant share of a properly defined relevant market.112 The
same thing is true of patent pools and standard setting addressed under anti-
trust’s rule of reason.113 Patent ties are not unlawful unless the patentee holds
power in the patented tying product, and this requires a market definition and
computation of a market share in that market.114 Indeed, the only Patent Act
provision that makes market power relevant is the Patent Misuse Reform Act,
which declares that patent ties will not constitute misuse unless the patentee has
market power in the tying product.115
To be sure, one of the most studied issues in the industrial organization
literature is the relationship between market structure and innovation.116 One
would never know it, however, from reading federal court intellectual property
110. BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 332, 337–38, 347–48.
111. See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at ch. 12 (drawing from ELINOR OSTROM,
GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 61–65 (1990) and
Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA, NEW SERIES 386 (1937)).
112. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 176–78 (1965).
113. See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 353–63.
114. Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 46 (2006).
115. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No.
112-29, § 5(b), 125 Stat. 284, 299 (2012) (“No patent owner . . . shall be . . . deemed guilty of misuse or
illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having . . . conditioned the license of any rights to
the patent or the sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or
purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power
in the relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned.”).
116. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
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decisions. Market structure and market power in particular have never been
particularly important in IP cases.
The antitrust statutes are not a great deal more explicit than the IP laws are
about market structure. They never speak of market power or a relevant market,
although the merger provision uses the term “line of commerce,” which the
courts have sometimes equated with a relevant product market.117 The Sherman
Act speaks only of practices that “restrain trade”118 or that “monopolize”119 but
does not mention markets. The law of relevant markets in antitrust is entirely
judge-made, much of it originating in Judge Hand’s important decision in the
Alcoa aluminum monopolization case.120
Should IP law follow the lead given by antitrust and develop rules relating IP
law more specifically to market structure? Justice Breyer’s statement in Pro-
metheus that patent rules may have to be applied differently in different markets
gives at least a little reason for thinking so.121 Historically, resistance to
diversity of application in IP law results from the IP statutes being much more
detailed than the antitrust laws and thus leaving much less room for judicially
initiated structural analysis. Second, and relatedly, the most important issues
have been statutorily preempted. For example, it might be wise to give patents
or copyrights a durational term or differential scope that varies with the
industry,122 but the statutory language seems to preclude this. Finally, and most
importantly, IP law has never produced a sufficiently robust consensus about the
relationship between market structure and optimal IP protection. These facts
have historically served to keep serious market power inquiries off the table.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006) (condemning mergers in “any line of commerce” and in “any section of
the country”).
118. Id. at § 1.
119. Id. at § 2.
120. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
121. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012) (observing
that patent rules may have to be applied differently in different fields); see also supra note 82 and
accompanying text.
122. See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 137
(2009).
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